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Introduction 
 
Unemployment figures matter.  At the national scale, they are one of the main 
measures of the health and performance of the economy. 
 
At the local scale the figures probably matter even more.  They play the single 
most important role in defining how communities see themselves - as 
prosperous, depressed or middle-of-the-road.  Unemployment figures are pivotal 
in assessing the extent to which Britain still has a regional problem.  They are 
also central to how the European Union assesses the needs of Britain’s regions 
compared to those of other member states. 
 
It is unfortunate therefore that the principal official measure of unemployment - 
the monthly ‘claimant count’ - no longer commands credibility.  The criticisms 
have been numerous - from academic sources1, from independent watchdogs 
such as the Unemployment Unit2 and from no less a source than the Royal 
Statistical Society3.   
 
It is important to be clear about the nature of these criticisms.  No-one is 
suggesting that government statisticians have somehow acted unprofessionally 
and ‘fiddled the figures’.  Equally, no-one argues that the claimant count does not 
accurately measure exactly what it sets out to measure - the number of people 
out-of-work and claiming unemployment-related benefits.  The concern is that 
this no longer represents the totality of the problem.  The most widely quoted 
reason is that the eligibility to receive unemployment-related benefits has become 
more restricted.  There have been more than thirty important changes since the 
early 1980s4 which have had the effect of reducing the claimant count.  Indeed, 
the Department of Employment has from time to time deemed these revisions 
sufficiently important to justify revising down the old figures to place them on 
the same basis as the new ones.  During 1996, particularly important changes 
occurred.  In April the duration of non-means tested benefit was reduced from 
twelve to six months.  In October the shift from Unemployment Benefit to the 
Jobseekers Allowance imposed much stricter conditions on the eligibility for 
                                               
1
 for example, J Wells (1995)  ‘The missing million’ in K Coates (ed) The Right to Work, Spokesman, 
 Nottingham. 
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 for example, P Convery (1996)  ‘How many people are unemployed?, Working Brief, No. 78, pp. 23-26, 
 Unemployment Unit, London. 
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 Royal Statistical Society (1995)  Report of the Working Party on the Measurement of Unemployment in the 
 UK, Royal Statistical Society, London. 
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 see P Gregg (1994)  ‘Out for the count:  a social scientist’s account of unemployment statistics in the UK’,  
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benefit.  As ministers themselves acknowledge, the effect has been to further 
reduce the claimant count. 
 
It is therefore no longer controversial to note that beyond the numbers recorded 
by the claimant count there is a further group of people who are unemployed but 
who are not claiming unemployment-related benefits.  These people are excluded 
from the published figures. 
 
The other source of official data on unemployment is the Labour Force Survey.  
This is less well known but also less criticised.  The Labour Force Survey covers 
a sample of about 60,000 households across the country and produces figures on 
a quarterly basis.  These cover a wide range of information about the workforce 
including unemployment.  The definition of unemployment used by the Labour 
Force Survey is the one set out by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) - 
that the individual is without a job, is available to start work in the next fortnight 
and has actively looked for work in the last four weeks.  This internationally 
accepted definition is the main reason why the Labour Force Survey has been 
subject to less trenchant criticism than the claimant count. 
 
In recent years the Labour Force Survey has generated estimates of 
unemployment, on the ILO definition, that are a little above those from the 
claimant count.  For example the estimates for the summer of 1996 (the most 
recent presently available) show ILO unemployment to be 221,000 higher than 
the corresponding claimant count figure for Great Britain.  In practice, the ILO 
and claimant unemployed do cover two rather different groups of people, with 
some individuals included in one but excluded from the other.  However, the fact 
that the Labour Force Survey produces estimates of unemployment that are not 
wildly out-of-line with those from the claimant count has been used by the 
Department of Employment to defend the claimant count’s results5. 
 
Nevertheless, it is gradually becoming recognised that in the UK context the ILO 
definition used by the Labour Force Survey also generates misleading 
unemployment figures.  There are a number of reasons for this but broadly the 
problem concerns the way in which unemployment has become ‘hidden’.  In 
particular, there are built-in mechanisms in the social security system that divert 
large numbers of individuals off unemployment-related benefits and onto other 
forms of support, especially sickness-related benefits or, in some cases, out of the 
benefits system altogether.  These people thus drop out of the claimant count and 
when they are included in the Labour Force Survey are recorded as ‘sick’, ‘early 
                                               
5
 see Department of Employment (1995)  How Exactly is Unemployment Measured?  Department of 
 Employment, London. 
 
retired’, ‘looking after family/home’ or even as a ‘discouraged worker’.  Yet in 
reality many of these people retain impeccable credentials to be counted among 
the unemployed. 
 
All of these criticisms beg an important question.  If the claimant count and the 
Labour Force Survey do not provide a credible picture of the extent of the 
problem, what then is the real level of unemployment? 
 
It is this question which the present report addresses.  The next section explains 
how unemployment becomes hidden - a necessarily full explanation in parts 
because some of the processes have never previously been set out in a 
comprehensive way.  This is followed by an analysis of 1991 Census data using 
established, well-proven methods that have previously been used for small areas.  
The following section then provides estimates of ‘real unemployment’ for 
January 1997.  This is the heart of the analysis and is based upon an extension to 
the methods already applied to 1991 data.  Subsequent sections discuss the 
reliability of the new estimates and the implications for policy making.  An 
appendix presents the details of statistical sources and methods. 
 
 
How unemployment becomes hidden 
 
There are several mechanisms through which unemployment becomes hidden.   
 
As noted earlier, the claimant count is the number of people out-of-work and 
claiming unemployment-related benefits.  The first group of hidden unemployed 
are therefore those who are unemployed but not claiming benefit.  Most who fall 
into this category are non-claimants because they are ineligible to receive benefit.  
Amongst these are people who have left their job voluntarily or have been 
dismissed for misconduct, who are disqualified from benefit for a period.  They 
can still sign-on to receive National Insurance credits and some are eligible to 
receive means-tested benefits.  For many in these categories, however, there is no 
financial incentive to register as a claimant. 
 
More importantly, entitlement to means-tested benefits after six months out-of-
work - and earlier in the case of those with insufficient National Insurance credits 
- depends on household rather than individual circumstances.  For example, a 
man or woman with a partner in full-time work is ineligible for means-tested 
unemployment benefits.  The household may still be eligible for other means-
tested benefits - Housing Benefit for instance - if the wages are low, but the 
individual without a job is not counted as unemployed.  Ineligibility for benefit is 
especially widespread among women.  Many who are actively seeking work do 
not qualify because their partner is in work, and as a consequence they are 
omitted from the claimant count. 
 
The second group with a claim to being included among the hidden unemployed 
are those on government schemes.  At the present time, these schemes comprise 
Youth Training, Skillseekers, Youth Credits, Modern Apprenticeships and 
Training for Work, but their name and form has varied considerably over the 
years. 
 
When the predecessors of these schemes were first established in the 1970s they 
were widely regarded as merely a mechanism for keeping some of the 
unemployed gainfully occupied.  Participants certainly regarded themselves as 
unemployed first and foremost, and only temporarily diverted from that status.  
Over the years, attitudes to government schemes have mellowed and in many 
cases the training component has become more genuine.  Arguably, to suggest 
that those on government schemes should still be counted among the hidden 
unemployed is stretching a point. 
 
Against this view three points need to be made.  First, places on government 
schemes are not the same as conventional jobs.  There is a strong element of 
‘make-work’ and the remuneration - often benefit plus a few pounds - is well 
below that in conventional employment.   
 
Second, many participants on government schemes still see themselves as 
unemployed and only temporarily off the register, and would take a ‘proper’ job 
straightaway if one were available.  Indeed, for some individuals life has become 
near-permanent unemployment interspersed with time on schemes that lead 
nowhere. 
 
Third, the varying extent of participation in government schemes indicates that, 
whatever the intention, the effect has been to hide unemployment.  For instance, 
the number of men on schemes outnumbers women by three-to-two, against a 
background in which unemployment is more widespread among men.  More 
importantly, government schemes account for a much higher proportion of the 
workforce in areas of high unemployment.  Census data shows that in districts 
with very high claimant unemployment the proportion of the male workforce on 
government schemes is typically 4-5 per cent.  Conversely, where claimant 
unemployment is very low, the proportion on schemes is generally below one per 
cent. 
 
If the proportion on government schemes was more even across the country there 
would be a stronger case for seeing them as a normal part of the 
education/training process, analogous perhaps to staying on at school.  In fact, 
the local and regional incidence of government schemes indicates that though 
they may impart useful skills, they also continue to serve a second function as a 
mechanism for hiding unemployment. 
 
The other mechanisms by which unemployment becomes hidden owe less to 
public intervention and more to the responses of individuals faced with difficulty 
in finding work.  Especially in areas where there is a marked shortage of jobs, 
many people are realistic enough to recognise that they will never again find 
meaningful, decently-rewarded work.  Given the nature of the contemporary 
labour market, a great many of the people in this position are older men with 
essentially manual skills.  They therefore assess their options, including what the 
benefits system has to offer. 
 
To some individuals in this position, early retirement is the best way forward.  
This is a feasible option if they have a company pension to draw on and perhaps 
a lump-sum redundancy payment.  Without work they may be able to enjoy an 
adequate though not extravagant standard of living until the time, a few years 
hence, when they would have retired anyway.  Such individuals become largely 
decoupled from the labour market, only returning if a very attractive opportunity 
presents itself.  They do not appear as unemployed in either the claimant count or 
Labour Force Survey figures. 
 
Early retirement is not always unwelcome to the individual.  But in a proportion 
of cases it is forced upon them by the shortage of suitable jobs.  Their health and 
age may allow them to carry on working for some years, but the labour market 
does not.  These individuals for whom early retirement is a premature, enforced 
state ought to be regarded as part of the stock of hidden unemployed. 
 
The other option that some individuals are channelled towards is a move onto 
sickness-related benefits.  They thus drop out of the ranks of the unemployed and 
become reclassified as permanently sick.  This is now the single most important 
mechanism through which unemployment becomes hidden and it deserves a full 
explanation. 
 
It is not widely recognised that two benefit systems operate in parallel.  The first 
relates to ‘unemployment’, now in the form of the Jobseekers Allowance.  After 
six months this benefit is means-tested, as we noted earlier.  The other benefit 
system relates to ‘sickness’, now in the form of Incapacity Benefit.  Crucially, 
this benefit is not means-tested. 
 
For many of the long-term unemployed, the differential in benefits creates an 
incentive to move across on to Incapacity Benefit.  For example, an unemployed 
man in his fifties with a wife in work, perhaps part-time, with little or no 
mortgage and children who have left home will not generally be entitled to 
means-tested Jobseekers Allowance (or Income Support before October 1996).  
In essence, his wife’s earnings disqualify him from benefit.  But if he can secure 
a move across on to Incapacity Benefit he will receive a sum irrespective of his 
wife’s earnings. 
 
This is precisely the scenario that many unemployed men and women face.  The 
gatekeepers determining access to Incapacity Benefit are medical practitioners.  
Many older unemployed people have picked up injuries over the course of their 
working career.  This is especially true of men who have worked in heavy 
industry.  And there is the effect of simply getting older.  In practice, therefore, 
many of the long-term unemployed do manage to secure a move across on to 
Incapacity Benefit. 
 
In 1996, just over 5 per cent of all the claimants leaving the unemployment 
register for whatever reason - including finding a job - did so because of a move 
across on to sickness benefits.  Once on Incapacity Benefit, very few come off, 
not least because the chances of finding appropriate employment diminish still 
further as the period without work extends.  In April 1995, for instance, well over 
half of all those claiming sickness-related benefits had been doing so for more 
than three years.  More than a quarter had been claiming for more than six years. 
 
The numbers claiming various forms of sickness benefit are now truly 
astonishing.  Figure 1 shows the number of men and women of working age (16-
64 for men, 16-59 for women) claiming benefit for sickness or invalidity for 
more than six months.  The numbers have risen every year for the last decade and 
a half.  In April 1981 there were 574,000 men and women in this category.  By 
April 1995 the figure had risen to 1,809,000. 
 
Even this is not the full picture.  The majority of these claimants were on 
Incapacity Benefit or its predecessor, Invalidity Benefit.  Added to this there are 
more than 300,000 further claimants of working age receiving Severe 
Disablement Allowance, and those incapacitated by sickness for less than six 
months.  Department of Social Security statistics show than in August 1996 there 
was a grand total of 2.48 million people of working age claiming sickness-related 
benefit.  Of these, 1.56 million were men and 0.92 million were women.  To put 
it another way, there are now more people of working age ‘on the sick’ than ‘on 
the dole’. 
 
It is inconceivable that there has been a three-fold increase in the level of genuine 
incapacitating illness in the workforce over the last decade and a half.  Indeed, 
this rise has occurred at a time when general standards of health - measured by 
indicators such as standardised mortality rates - are known to be showing a slow 
but steady improvement.  What can be observed in the rise in long-term sickness 
claimants is above all not health but the operation of the labour market and the 
social security system. 
 
This impression is reinforced by the distribution of sickness claimants across the 
country, shown in Figures 2 to 5.  These maps use data specially provided by the 
Department of Social Security.  The claimant figures include all those of working 
age in receipt of Incapacity Benefit or Severe Disablement Allowance plus those 
receiving National Insurance credits for incapacity.  The short term sick - those 
who have been claimants for less than six months - are also included but they 
comprise only about ten per cent of the total number of claimants.  We have 
expressed the figures as a percentage of the working age population in each 
district, taken from the 1991 Census. 
 
What the maps reveal is an exceptional incidence of sickness claimants in places 
such as South Wales, Merseyside, Manchester, South Yorkshire, North East 
England and Clydeside.  In many of these, sickness claimants account for more 
than 15 per cent of the entire male workforce.  In a few places, the proportion 
exceeds 20 per cent - more than one-in-five of all males between the ages of 16 
and 64.  In contrast, in large parts of the South of England the proportion is 
below 5 per cent.  What the maps also reveal is that the proportion of women 
claiming sickness benefits is well below that for men but with much the same 
geographical distribution. 
 
This pattern is of course exactly what we would expect to observe as a result of 
the diversion of the long-term unemployed on to sickness-related benefits in 
areas of high unemployment.  Indeed, there is an uncanny resemblance between 
the geography of sickness-related claimants and the geography of 
unemployment-related claimants.  Even within the South East, for example, the 
coastal unemployment blackspots of Thanet, Clacton, Hastings and Brighton 
show up as having high levels of sickness claimants as well. 
 
What we are suggesting is that a proportion of the ‘permanently sick’ ought 
really to be seen as ‘hidden unemployed’.  That is not to say that the ailments are 
fictitious - the bad backs, limps and other disorders are no doubt real enough.  
But whether they can in many cases be described as incapacitating, in the sense 
of rendering the individual entirely incapable of employment, must be 
questioned. 
 
Furthermore, in suggesting that many permanently sick are in reality unemployed 
we are in no sense arguing that there is social security fraud.  Rather, given the 
labour market they face and the operation of the benefits system, the individuals 
in question are responding rationally to their predicament.  They ought not to be 
criticised for their actions, which are perfectly legal.  Moreover a whole range of 
professionals, especially GPs but also Department of Employment staff, have 
colluded in and legitimated the large-scale transfer of the unemployed on to 
sickness benefits. 
 
The government seems to share this view.  From the mid 1980s onwards it 
operated a policy which actually encouraged the shift.  Staff of the then 
Department of Employment were pressed to reduce the number of unemployed 
claimants.  At ‘Restart’ interviews and in other face-to-face situations, they often 
encouraged the unemployed to move on to more suitable benefits and thus out of 
the headline figures.  Sickness-related benefits were a popular option.  Then in 
April 1995, with the introduction of Incapacity Benefit to replace Invalidity 
Benefit, the policy changed.  The medical criteria for securing a move on to 
Incapacity Benefit are tougher, and the claimants carried over from the previous 
benefits regime are being re-evaluated.  Clearly the government now thinks that 
the diversion has gone too far, not least because it is so expensive, and that the 
hidden unemployed should be weeded out from the genuinely sick. 
 
The net effect of the various mechanisms through which unemployment becomes 
hidden is that the form of non-employment across the life cycle has developed an 
interesting pattern.  Recorded unemployment forms only one part.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 6 for men and Figure 7 for women, using data from the 1991 
Census of Population. 
 
For men, non-employment is especially important for the under 25s and the over 
50s, but the form it takes at these two ends of the age-range differs.  For the 
under 25s, extended stays in education, government schemes and unemployment 
are the main forms of non-employment.  For those between 25 and 50, 
unemployment is the main form of joblessness, but the vast majority of this 
middle group are in work.  For those over 50, unemployment is still important 
but ‘permanent sickness’ and, eventually, ‘early retirement’ become more 
important - more important in fact than ‘unemployment’ itself. 
 
For women, the picture differs because the category ‘other inactive’ - essentially 
those looking after home or family full-time - is of major importance at nearly all 
stages in the life cycle.  But some of the features identifiable for men are also 
present.  Among younger women, extended stays in education and government 
schemes are important;  among older women ‘permanent sickness’ becomes 
evident, though not to the same extent as for men. 
 
The point is that the forms which joblessness takes have become more varied and 
complex.  Conventional unemployment - in the sense measured by the claimant 
count or the Labour Force Survey - is only part of the overall picture.  But an 
important part of the other categories of non-employment is made up of the 
hidden unemployed. 
 
 
Measuring hidden unemployment 
 
In two previous publications, two of the present authors developed and applied a 
method for measuring hidden unemployment.  The first of these studies covered 
the coalfields6, the second England’s Rural Development Areas7.  In this method 
- the Beatty/Fothergill approach - the hidden unemployed are then added to the 
claimant count to produce estimates of ‘real unemployment’. 
 
In the form that it has previously been applied to the coalfields and rural areas, 
the Beatty/Fothergill approach uses Census of Population data for April 1991.  
The approach adds four groups of hidden unemployed to the claimant count. 
 
The first group are the extra unemployed recorded by the Census of Population.  
‘Unemployed’ in the Census is a self-reported category and therefore includes 
some people who are ineligible for benefit and excluded from the claimant count.  
The second group of hidden unemployed are those on government schemes.  The 
third and fourth groups are the excess numbers recorded as ‘early retired’ and 
‘permanently sick’.  The Census allows each of these four groups to be measured 
accurately, with no overlap between them. 
 
A crucial assumption in this context is the use of the South East of England as a 
benchmark.  In this method, the proportions of men and women of working age 
that are recorded by the Census as ‘early retired’ and ‘permanently sick’ in the 
South East at the time of the Census (April 1991) are used as the yardstick to 
define ‘excess’.  For men these proportions are 2.2 and 3.4 per cent respectively, 
and for women 0.9 and 2.4 per cent.  Excesses over these proportions in any 
locality are counted as hidden unemployed. 
 
Later we subject this benchmark to scrutiny, but at this stage it is worth noting 
that there is a very simple logic behind it.  In April 1991 the South East had only 
recently emerged from a prolonged period (c. 1986-90) of virtually full 
employment.  The relatively low levels of early retirement and permanent 
sickness which prevailed in this region at that time therefore probably represent 
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 C Beatty and S Fothergill (1996)  ‘Labour market adjustment in areas of chronic industrial decline:  the case 
of  the UK coalfields’,  Regional Studies, Vol. 30, pp. 627-640. 
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 C Beatty and S Fothergill (1997)  Unemployment and the Labour Market in Rural Development Areas, 
 Rural Development Commission, London. 
 
the levels achievable in a reasonably fully employed economy.  Excesses over 
this level are thus likely to be a form of hidden unemployment. 
 
Although this approach to measuring hidden unemployment has previously been 
applied only to small areas, the comprehensive nature of the Census of 
Population data lends itself to nation-wide application.  The resulting estimates 
of real unemployment for Great Britain as a whole in April 1991 are shown in 
Table 1.  At that time the claimant count recorded a total of 2.1 million 
unemployed. 
 
 
Table 1:  Alternative measures of unemployment, Great Britain, April 1991 
 
 
 Male Female Total 
 
 
CLAIMANT COUNT 
 
 
1,592,000 
 
 
507,000 
 
 
2,100,000 
    
HIDDEN UNEMPLOYED    
Extra Census unemployed 114,000 258,000 371,000 
Government schemes 216,000 124,000 340,000 
Excess ‘early retired’ 75,000 29,000 104,000 
Excess ‘permanently sick’ 360,000 193,000 553,000 
 ________ ________ ________ 
 
REAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
2,357,000 
 
1,111,000 
 
3,468,000 
    
Unemployment rates:    
    
     Claimant count * 10.6 4.6 8.1 
    
     Real unemployment ** 15.2 9.9 13.0 
 
 
*    as % of economically active 
**  as % of economically active plus hidden unemployed 
 
 
Sources:  NOMIS, Census of Population, authors’ estimates 
 
 
 
 Our figures, using the Beatty/Fothergill approach, indicate that the real level of 
unemployment was 3.5 million.  Corresponding unemployment rates were 8.1 
and 13.0 per cent respectively8. 
 
Our figures indicate that in April 1991 there was a total of 765,000 men who 
could be described as ‘hidden unemployed’, and 604,000 women.  The most 
important mechanism hiding the unemployed was the diversion into ‘permanent 
sickness’, accounting for 553,000 in total but especially important among men.  
Among women, unemployed non-claimants - i.e. those declaring themselves 
unemployed in the Census but not included in the claimant count - were 
especially important at 258,000. 
 
On the basis of these figures therefore, hidden unemployment appears 
exceptionally extensive.  Real unemployment, as a consequence, is far above the 
level indicated by official data. 
 
 
Up-dating to 1997 
 
Unfortunately, there is no single comprehensive source of data comparable to the 
Census of Population that allows an easy up-date of real unemployment estimates 
to 1997.  We have therefore employed the same basic approach but had to piece 
together the jigsaw using data from different sources.  The full details are set out 
in an appendix but the fundamentals require explanation here. 
 
In the 1991 analysis the extra unemployed identified by the Census of 
Population, compared to the claimant count, were included as hidden 
unemployed.  Most if not all of these extra unemployed will be non-claimants.  
This reflects the fact that in the Census ‘unemployed’ is a self-declared category, 
independent of claimant status.  This self-declared concept of unemployment is 
similar to the one used by the quarterly Labour Force Survey, which asks people 
whether they are out-of-work, looking for work, and available to start.  In the 
1997 analysis we therefore include the excess of Labour Force Survey 
unemployment over the claimant count.  Significantly, the Census and Labour 
Force Survey-based measures of this form of hidden unemployment generate 
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 The rates of real unemployment for Great Britain as a whole shown in Table 1 are slightly higher than those 
 previously published using the Beatty/Fothergill method.  Here the GB rates are derived from a summation of 
 unemployment figures for individual districts, whereas previously they have been derived by a single national 
 calculation.  The difference arises because some individual districts have rates of permanent  sickness 
and early  retirement below the South East benchmark and these negative values are discounted in the district-level 
 calculations.  The GB rates presented here are the superior estimate. 
 
broadly similar figures, with the number of women well in excess of the number 
of men. 
 
Numbers on government schemes can be measured directly from administrative 
data held by government departments and agencies. 
 
The number of people ‘early retired’, and thereby the excess attributable to 
hidden unemployment, cannot be measured directly from any source for dates 
later than 1991.  However, Labour Force Survey data suggests that there has been 
little change in the proportion of men who are early retired, as explained in the 
statistical appendix.  We have therefore carried forward the 1991 numbers of 
excess early retired men to the 1997 analysis.  In the absence of data to the 
contrary, the same procedure has been adopted for women. 
 
The number of people ‘permanently sick’, and again thereby the excess 
attributable to hidden unemployment, can be measured directly using 
unpublished data from the Department of Social Security. 
 
The points in time for which up-dated information is available vary.  For the 
Labour Force Survey unemployed, it is for Summer 1996.  For government 
schemes the data is for October 1996, December 1996 and January 1997, 
depending on locality.  For the sick the data is for August 1996.  The numbers of 
hidden unemployed in these categories have been added to the claimant count 
figures for January 1997 to give what we have called a ‘January 1997’ estimate 
of real unemployment. 
 
Not all the up-dated information is available disaggregated by sex or district.  In 
some cases we have therefore had to adopt procedures that allocate figures for 
counties or TEC areas, for example, to individual districts.  Crucially, however, 
figures on the number of sickness-related benefit claimants are available for 
every district in Great Britain and separately for men and women.  This is 
important because the excess ‘permanently sick’ form the largest component of 
the hidden unemployed, and the district-level figures which we calculate are as a 
result essentially based on hard data rather than imputed figures. 
 
Finally, the 1997 analysis continues to use the South East in 1991 as the 
benchmark against which to measure excess levels of ‘early retirement’ and 
‘permanent sickness’.  The logic here continues to be that the low rates 
prevailing in this region at that point in time are probably a good guide to what 
can be achieved in a reasonably fully-employed economy. 
 
 
Unemployment:  the real picture 
 
The estimates that result from applying our methods to the data are shown in 
Table 2, which refers to Great Britain as a whole.  These figures are, we believe, 
central to an understanding of the contemporary unemployment problem. 
 
Overall, our figures indicate that in January 1997 the real level of unemployment 
was 3.9 million, or 14.4 per cent.  This compares with a claimant count figure for  
 
 
Table 2:  Alternative measures of unemployment, Great Britain,  
     January 1997 
 
 Male Female Total 
 
 
CLAIMANT COUNT 
 
 
1,407,000 
 
 
429,000 
 
 
1,837,000 
    
HIDDEN UNEMPLOYED    
Extra LFS unemployed  60,000 270,000 340,000 
Government schemes 260,000 150,000 400,000 
Excess ‘early retired’ 80,000 30,000 100,000 
Excess ‘permanently sick’ 820,000 450,000 1,260,000 
 ________ ________ ________ 
 
REAL UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
2,620,000 
 
1,330,000 
 
3,950,000 
    
Unemployment rates:    
    
     Claimant count * 9.4 3.9 7.1 
    
     Real unemployment ** 16.4 10.9 14.2 
 
 
*    as % of economically active 
**  as % of economically active plus hidden unemployed 
 
Note:  numbers of hidden and real unemployed rounded to nearest 10,000 
 
 
Sources:  NOMIS, Census of Population, DSS, DfEE, Welsh Office, Scottish 
Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, authors’ estimates. 
 
the same month of 1.8 million, or 7.1 per cent.  In other words, the real level of 
unemployment was slightly more than double the claimant count figure. 
 
The inclusion of hidden unemployment increases unemployment among men by 
85 per cent but triples the number of unemployed women.  Including the hidden 
unemployed, men nevertheless still outnumber women by two-to-one. 
 
Comparing the 1997 estimates with the 1991 figures presented earlier, the 
claimant count shows a fall of more than 250,000 but real unemployment has 
risen by nearly 500,000. 
 
The largest source of hidden unemployment, accounting for nearly all the 
increase since 1991, is ‘permanent sickness’.  Our figures indicate that some 1.2 
million men and women have been diverted from ‘unemployment’ to ‘permanent 
sickness’ by the operation of the social security system.   
 
This last number is enormous by any standards.  However, it needs to be seen in 
context.  We have already noted that there are presently nearly 2.5 million people 
of working age claiming sickness-related benefits.  We have also noted that, in 
the last decade and a half, there has been a three-fold increase in the number of 
long-term sickness claimants of working age.  And we noted that there are 
financial incentives in the benefits system that make it worthwhile for many of 
the long-term unemployed to move across on to sickness-related benefits.  
Against this backcloth, the estimate that 1.2 million of the ‘permanently sick’ are 
really ‘hidden unemployed’ is not unreasonable. 
 
Comprehensive figures on claimant and real unemployment by district, county 
and region, for January 1997, are presented at the end of this report. 
 
Table 3 shows the top and bottom ten districts across Britain in terms of total real 
unemployment.  Merthyr Tydfil, in the South Wales valleys, has the dubious 
distinction of the highest rate - more than 33 per cent.  Hart, a district in north 
east Hampshire well within London’s affluent commuter belt, has the lowest rate 
- just over 3 per cent. 
 
Such large differences between extremes point to a general issue:  apart from 
increasing the overall rate of unemployment, a shift from ‘claimant’ to ‘real’ 
rates also widens differentials.  Typically, districts with low claimant 
unemployment (3-4 per cent) have rates of real unemployment that are only 2-3 
percentage points higher.  Districts with high claimant unemployment (10 per 
cent or more) generally have rates of real unemployment that are 10 or more 
percentage points higher.  Once more this is entirely consistent with the 
expectation that in areas  
 Table 3:  Districts with highest and lowest total real unemployment,    
     January 1997 
 
 
HIGHEST 
 
per cent 
 
Merthyr Tydfil 33.4 
Liverpool 32.0 
Knowsley 31.8 
Rhondda 31.6 
Easington 31.2 
Blaenau Gwent 31.1 
Glasgow 30.6 
Port Talbot 30.5 
Cumnock and Doon Valley 28.7 
Hackney 28.7 
 
 
 
LOWEST  
 
Hart 3.1 
Wokingham 4.0 
Surrey Heath 4.1 
Woking 4.1 
Test Valley 4.3 
Basingstoke and Deane 4.5 
Harborough 4.5 
Uttlesford 4.5 
Waverley 4.5 
Horsham 4.6 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ estimates 
 
 
where jobs are hardest to find, the pressures causing a diversion from recorded to 
hidden unemployment are likely to be greatest. 
 
No fewer than 70 districts or boroughs have real rates of unemployment that are 
estimated to exceed 20 per cent.  These include several substantial towns and 
cities - Brighton, Glasgow, Hull, Liverpool, Manchester, Middlesbrough, 
Newcastle, Nottingham, Sunderland and Swansea for example - as well as seven 
inner London boroughs.  No fewer than 22 districts have estimated real rates of 
unemployment exceeding 25 per cent. 
 
 
How accurate? 
 
The critical question is of course the reliance that can be placed on our estimates 
of real unemployment, especially as they diverge so markedly from the official 
figures. 
 
The first point to note is that the competing sets of figures do not all try to 
measure the same thing.  In essence, our definition of real unemployment counts 
those who might reasonably be expected to have been in work in a fully-
employed economy.  They are counted whether or not they happen to be active 
job seekers or claimants of unemployment-related benefits.  In contrast, the 
claimant count sets out to include just the claimants, and the ILO definition of 
unemployment used by the Labour Force Survey includes just the active job 
seekers. 
 
Many of the people we count as hidden unemployed have probably accepted that 
because of the shortage of jobs, their remaining years to retirement age will have 
to be spent on sickness benefits or pension.  These people are not job seekers in 
the terms of the Labour Force Survey because they have in effect detached 
themselves from the labour market.  Nevertheless, the process of detachment is 
itself the result of unemployment - in places where it is difficult to find work, 
many people simply give up the struggle altogether.  Furthermore, as we have 
explained, in the UK context there are powerful interactions between different 
parts of the benefits system that encourage large numbers to drop out of the 
claimant count and out of the process of job search.  These people may no longer 
be receiving unemployment benefits or even looking for work, but they should 
still be counted among the ‘real unemployed’. 
 
Putting aside these conceptual issues, there is still the question of the extent to 
which ‘real unemployment’ has been measured accurately.  The issues divide 
into two categories - problems of calculation and problems of definition. 
 
Regarding problems of calculation, it must be conceded that there is a margin of 
error in all the figures.  This arises from a number of sources:  the data that 
provides the building blocks for hidden unemployment is not all for January 
1997;  the allocation of global figures between districts has in some cases been 
necessary;  and the data is derived from a number of separate administrative 
sources that may not be wholly compatible at the margins. 
 
It is impossible to put a wholly accurate figure on this built-in error.  Our 
assessment would be that rates of real unemployment for individual districts may 
be accurate to within one or two percentage points of the quoted figure.  On the 
other hand, given the methods used, some of the errors will cancel out - if the 
true level of unemployment has been overestimated in one district, it will 
correspondingly be underestimated in a neighbouring district.  Errors of 
estimation arising from these sources would also be insufficient to make any 
difference to the basic pattern or magnitude of real unemployment across the 
country. 
 
In passing, it is worth noting that the Labour Force Survey, being a sample, is 
affected by errors of estimation.  And the claimant count is profoundly 
compromised as a measure of unemployment because it is no more than the by-
product of the application of social security rules. 
 
Three problems of definition deserve mention.  The first is the inclusion of 
people on government schemes as part of the hidden unemployed.  Since these 
individuals are engaged in gainful economic activity, it is not difficult to devise a 
case for their exclusion.  Our judgement is that they should be included, as we 
explained earlier, not least because their concentration in areas of high 
unemployment suggests that government schemes do have the effect of 
disguising even greater unemployment.  If those on government schemes were to 
be excluded, the total number of real unemployed would be reduced by 400,000, 
to around 3.5 million or 13 per cent.  The reduction in areas of low 
unemployment would be about half a percentage point, and in areas of high 
unemployment the reduction would be 3-4 percentage points. 
 
The second definitional issue concerns women who are looking after children or 
home full-time.  For many this role is the alternative to employment and, even if 
they want employment, those with partners in work often find themselves 
ineligible for means-tested benefits.  This group undoubtedly includes substantial 
hidden unemployed. 
 
Our method includes non-claimant women only if they declare themselves to the 
Labour Force Survey as ‘actively seeking work’.  Quite a number do - hence the 
excess of Labour Force Survey unemployment over the claimant count for 
women.  However, there will be a further group of women who would like work 
but do not even look because they know the appropriate opportunities are not 
available.  This further group, whose size is difficult to assess, is excluded from 
our figures.  Its inclusion would boost ‘hidden’ and ‘real’ unemployment to still 
higher levels. 
 
The third definitional issue is our use of the South East of England in April 1991 
as the benchmark.  To recall, the rates of early retirement and permanent sickness 
in this region are used as a guide to what is achievable in a relatively full-
employed economy.  This important assumption has already been the subject of 
academic debate9. 
 
The arguments against the South East benchmark can be summarised as follows.  
It may be too high because by April 1991 the South East was already entering 
recession, and anyway there are parts of the region where there never was full 
employment even at the peak of the 1980s boom.  So the South East’s sickness 
and retirement figures will themselves include some hidden unemployed.  
Conversely, the South East may be too low as a benchmark because in some 
areas of heavy industry in particular there may be genuinely higher underlying 
levels of permanent sickness arising from the nature of local employment. 
 
Both these conflicting positions have validity.  The fundamental problem is that 
there is no way of directly measuring underlying levels of genuine incapacitating 
sickness in different parts of the country.  It is possible, nevertheless, to place 
parameters on the possible bias inherent in the 1991 South East benchmark.  For 
instance, if the rate of permanent sickness recorded among working age men in 
the South East in 1981 - 2.1 per cent - was used as the benchmark to reflect 
levels of incapacity prevailing before the big rise in the figures in the 1980s and 
1990s, our figures would show an increase in real male unemployment in most 
districts of 1.3 per cent.  This in turn would add nearly 200,000 to real male 
unemployment in January 1997.  Conversely, if rates of permanent sickness 
among men in the coalfields in 1981 - 4.8 per cent - were taken as a guide to 
underlying rates in areas of heavy industry, the effect would be to reduce 
estimated rates of real male unemployment in these places by 1.4 percentage 
points.  This in turn would reduce the national count by 50-100,000, depending 
on how geographically extensive these areas of heavy industry were deemed to 
be. 
 
Our preferred benchmark remains the South East in April 1991.  Although the 
boom conditions of preceding years were receding fast by then, lags can be 
expected before recession feeds into levels of ‘permanent sickness’ and ‘early 
retirement’.  This benchmark is neither at the top nor bottom of the range of 
alternative assumptions.  Also it has the merits of simplicity:  the South East is 
widely recognised to be the UK’s most prosperous region.  The low levels of 
‘permanent sickness’ and ‘early retirement’ that prevailed in this region at the 
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end of a long economic boom are as good a guide as any to what is achievable in 
a fully employed economy. 
 
Nevertheless, in the final reckoning it has to be acknowledged that our figures for 
real unemployment remain estimates.  They are based on specific assumptions 
and on inferences from aggregate data.  Within this constraint, we are 
nonetheless confident that the estimates do identify the broad scale and 
geographical distribution of the problem. 
 
 
Some implications 
 
Unemployment figures are of central importance to the way that different parts of 
the country and the economy as a whole are perceived.  An alternative set of 
figures inevitably has wide-ranging implications. 
 
First, there is the extent to which there is still a regional problem in Britain.  One 
of the unusual features of the early 1990s recession was that it was associated 
with an apparently sharp convergence in regional unemployment rates.  London’s 
claimant unemployment rate, for example, actually rose above that in Scotland 
for the first time in three generations.  The much-hyped North-South divide 
seemed to be dying. 
 
Unemployment is of course only one measure of regional well-being, but the 
figures for real unemployment suggest that the differences are in fact still alive 
and well, and much larger than the claimant count has indicated.  Table 4 lists the 
counties with the greatest divergence between their estimated real unemployment 
and the GB average.  The table also shows the equivalent divergence measured 
by the claimant count.  It is clear that the gap between different parts of Britain is 
much greater using this wider measure of unemployment.  The apparent waning 
of the regional problem has been an illusion. 
 
The second important implication of the new figures concerns Britain’s position 
compared to other EU member states.  This is illustrated by Table 5.  The official 
unemployment comparisons, published in Labour Market Trends, show the UK 
two-thirds of the way down the unemployment league table, below the other 
large economies of the EU.  Inserting the estimates of real unemployment instead 
places Britain close to the top. 
 
Strictly speaking, it is not proper to compare figures for ‘real unemployment’ in 
Britain with unadjusted figures for other EU states.  Undoubtedly there is hidden 
unemployment in other member states too.  However, the point is that in Britain 
this hidden unemployment is exceptionally large - so large in fact as to devalue 
Table 4:  Counties with highest and lowest total unemployment,  
     January 1997 
 
 Divergence from GB average rate (%) 
 
 Real unemployment Claimant count 
 
HIGHEST 
 
  
Merseyside +11.7 +4.3 
Mid Glamorgan +11.5 +0.7 
West Glamorgan +10.6 +0.9 
Cleveland +9.1 +4.4 
Isle of Wight +9.1 +3.8 
Strathclyde +9.0 +2.0 
Dyfed +8.2 +1.8 
Gwent +7.9 +0.4 
Tyne and Wear +7.6 +3.0 
Durham +6.8 +0.3 
   
LOWEST 
 
  
Surrey -9.2 -4.4 
Wiltshire -8.2 -3.1 
Berkshire -7.9 -3.6 
Oxfordshire -7.8 -3.8 
Buckinghamshire -7.4 -3.7 
West Sussex -7.0 -3.4 
Northamptonshire -6.3 -2.6 
Hampshire -6.2 -2.5 
Borders -6.1 -2.7 
Hertfordshire -6.1 -3.4 
 
 
Sources:  NOMIS and authors’ estimates 
 
 
the Labour Force Survey figures on which the international comparisons are 
based.  It cannot be assumed that unemployment is so markedly under-recorded 
in 
other member states, especially as they may not have benefits systems that 
operate so powerfully to divert people out of recorded unemployment. 
 
 Table 5:  Unemployment rates in EU countries 
 
 per cent 
 
Spain 21.4 
Finland 15.1 
GB - real unemployment 14.2 
France 12.5 
Ireland 12.4 
Italy 12.2 
Sweden 10.2 
Belgium 9.7 
Greece 9.7 
Germany 9.0 
UK - official unemployment 8.1 
Portugal 7.1 
Netherlands 6.7 
Denmark 5.7 
Austria 4.1 
Luxembourg 3.2 
 
 
Note:  GB real unemployment is for January 1997.  All other figures are for July, 
August or September 1996, except Greece (1995) and are standardised, 
seasonally adjusted rates. 
 
Sources:  Labour Market Trends, authors’ estimates. 
 
 
Indeed, the available evidence points towards much higher diversion than in 
other EU states.  In Britain, the 2.5 million people of working age now claiming 
sickness-related benefits represents about 7 per cent of the entire working-age 
population.  Comparable figures are hard to come by, but a study of OECD  
countries10 showed that the proportions for other EU member states (in 1990) 
were just over 4 per cent for Germany, less than 3 per cent for Spain, and less 
than 2 per cent for France.  Among the larger member states only Italy, at 11 per 
cent, exceeded the present British figure.  Furthermore, between 1980 and 1993 
the number of invalidity benefit recipients rose faster in the UK than in any other 
EU or OECD member state. 
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 EU-wide comparisons are of more than passing importance.  The areas eligible 
for assistance under the European Union’s ‘Objective 2’ programme - aid to 
industrial areas in difficulty - depend a great deal on relative levels of 
unemployment and the map will be redrawn at the end of 1999.  The UK is 
presently the biggest single recipient from this budget - £4 billion in the present 
spending round.  On the official unemployment figures, British regions look 
unlikely to receive much if any follow-on funding.  On more realistic 
unemployment figures, the outcome could be very different. 
 
The third set of implications are for macroeconomic policy.  At the present time - 
Spring 1997 - there is much concern that the economy may be not too far from 
‘overheating’.  With claimant count unemployment falling sharply after four 
years of sustained if unspectacular growth, there are fears that inflation could 
begin to accelerate because of pressure of demand and labour shortages.  The 
Bank of England has been prominent in voicing these fears.  But if real 
unemployment is 3.9 million, as our figures indicate, not 1.8 million, the 
inflationary pressures in the labour market may be altogether more remote. 
 
Attractive though this logic sounds, it is only partly valid.  The problem is that a 
great many of the hidden unemployed have undoubtedly become thoroughly 
detached from the labour market.  The shortage of suitable jobs has driven large 
numbers of long-term unemployed into long-term ‘sickness’ in particular, but it 
is far from clear that the process works in reverse when jobs are more readily 
available.  A transfer from unemployment to sickness benefits may be a one-way 
ticket - skills become rusty, motivation wanes, the daily pattern of working life 
becomes a thing of the past.  Significantly, even during the economic boom of 
the late 1980s, when claimant unemployment fell by 1.5 million, the number of 
long-term sickness benefit claimants did not decline. 
 
Just how many of the hidden unemployed might be reconnected to the labour 
market is therefore an important issue for macroeconomic policy - indeed, for 
training and labour market policies as well.  There is a serious risk that in an 
economy that has created and sustained such high levels of unemployment, and 
then pushed so much of it from view, it may prove very difficult to get real levels 
of unemployment down again.  The costs in terms of wasted productive potential 
and on-going social security payments are already enormous. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Two deep recessions since the beginning of the 1980s and the onward march of 
technology have profoundly affected the nature of the UK labour market.  In 
particular, the traditional industries that once employed large numbers of male 
manual workers have either gone or changed out of all recognition.  The coal 
industry, which has shed nearly 250,000 jobs since 1985, is just an extreme 
example of a process that has been at work across large swathes of British 
industry. 
 
Against this backdrop it is hardly surprising that there is large-scale 
unemployment.  The old jobs have gone;  the workers that have been displaced 
are not necessarily in the right locations or do not always have the right skills to 
fill the new jobs that have been created. 
 
In the face of such radical economic change, the surprising feature is perhaps that 
the official unemployment figures have been so low.  In much of the South, 
official unemployment rates have never risen beyond single-digit levels.  In parts 
of the North - like the coalfields - official rates have barely reacted to the 
disappearance of formerly dominant employers. 
 
Yet the everyday experience of many people, especially in areas of severe job 
loss, is often very different.  They know at first hand the difficulty in finding 
work, and the experiences of their family, neighbours and friends.  To them, the 
official unemployment figures seem unrealistic. 
 
What our estimates of real unemployment do is build a bridge between the two 
positions.  The official figures are accurate in so far as they measure the number 
of claimants or the number of active job seekers.  But this is no longer the totality 
of the unemployment problem.  Beyond those who are officially counted, there is 
a further army of people that unemployment and the benefits system have pushed 
to the very margins of the labour market.  They are unemployed but no longer 
counted as such - the hidden unemployed. 
 
The official unemployment figures are correct within the narrow confines of 
what they set out to measure.  But ordinary people are correct in telling the 
government statisticians that unemployment is far, far more widespread. 
 APPENDIX:  Statistical sources and methods 
 
 
Districts 
 
The districts and boroughs used throughout this study are the local government units as 
defined up until the end of March 1996.  In April 1996, local government was 
reorganised in Scotland, Wales and parts of England resulting in new district 
boundaries, but comparatively little data is yet available for these new units. 
 
Derivation of unemployment rates 
 
All the unemployment rates presented in this report use 1991 economically active 
persons of working age, from the Census of Population, as the denominator.  The 
economically active comprise the employed (including self-employed) and recorded 
unemployed, plus those on government schemes.  For rates of real unemployment, the 
hidden unemployed are added to the economically active to calculate a rate. 
 
The use of a 1991 denominator to create 1997 estimates is not ideal.  However, more 
up-to-date measures of the economically active population are not available at the 
district scale and the Registrar General’s mid-year population estimates for districts are 
subject to inaccuracies.  The use of a 1991 denominator introduces a distortion into the 
estimated rates in districts where the rate of population change is particularly rapid, but 
such instances are relatively few and the bias is unlikely to exceed 1 percentage point.  
Districts that are experiencing rapid population growth will tend to have their 1997 
unemployment rates slightly overestimated;  districts experiencing rapid population loss 
will have their 1997 rates underestimated.  Because the number of economically active 
women is gradually rising, the use of a 1991 denominator also tends to inflate female 
unemployment rates. 
 
Claimant count 
 
The numbers out of work and claiming unemployment-related benefits (the ‘claimant 
count’) are those produced for districts by the Department for Education and 
Employment, accessed by the NOMIS system. 
 
The claimant count unemployment rates for local areas presented in this report are for 
districts and differ from the official published figures which are for travel-to-work 
areas. 
 
LFS unemployment 
 
The excess of Labour Force Survey (LFS) unemployment over the claimant count is one 
of the components making up the estimates of real unemployment in 1997.   
 
This exercise uses the LFS unemployment rates (based on the ILO definition) from the 
Summer 1996 quarterly survey, which is presently the most up-to-date available.  These 
rates are compared with the claimant count unemployment rates for the same quarter 
(i.e. an average of the June, July and August 1996 figures).  The exercise has been 
conducted separately for males and females. 
 
Because of the limited sample size, LFS unemployment rates are not available for the 
majority of districts and about half of all counties, though those with missing values are 
normally the areas with a smaller population.  Where a district LFS rate is unavailable, 
the appropriate county rate has been inserted, and where a county rate is unavailable, 
the appropriate regional rate has been used.  Comparisons have in these cases been with 
the corresponding claimant count rate for the county or region.  The differences 
between the LFS and claimant count rates have been translated into absolute numbers, 
using the 1991 economically active population in each district, for inclusion in the real 
unemployment totals. 
 
Negative values for some districts (where the LFS rate is less than the claimant rate) 
have been discounted in this calculation.  This means that the extra LFS unemployed 
derived from the summation of district figures is 371,000 compared with an excess of 
221,000 derived from a comparison of national LFS and claimant count figures. 
 
Government schemes 
 
The up-to-date numbers on government schemes are derived from four sources.  For 
England they have been supplied by the Department for Education and Employment and 
relate to October 1996.  For Wales they come from the Welsh Office and relate to 
January 1997.  For Scotland they come from Scottish Enterprise and from Highlands 
and Islands Enterprise and relate to December 1996. 
 
In every case the statistics are for TEC areas (LECs in Scotland).  These mostly cover 
individual large districts or groups of neighbouring districts.  The 1996/7 figures for 
individual TECs/LECs have been allocated to individual districts on the basis of the 
district’s share of the number on government schemes in the corresponding area in 
1991, from the Census of Population.  In a small number of cases, a district is divided 
between two or more TECs/LECs.  In these cases, the numbers for the two or more 
TECs/LECs have been added together and allocated across the whole area in proportion 
to the 1991 data. 
 
Only the Scottish figures are available disaggregated by sex.  For England and Wales, 
the estimated numbers in each district have been divided by sex on the basis of the 1991 
male/female split in numbers on government schemes resident in the district. 
 
Early retirement 
 
The excess number of early retired, who are counted as hidden unemployed, are carried 
forward from the 1991 analysis.  This is the excess over the proportion of men and 
women of working age who are ‘early retired’ in the South East of England, taken from 
the 1991 Census of Population. 
 
The numbers early retired for dates later than 1991 cannot be measured directly from 
any source.  However, Labour Force Survey data suggests that there has been little if 
any change since 1991 in the proportion of men of working age who are early retired.  
Between Spring 1991 and Spring 1995, the economically active share of the GB 
working age male population fell by 3.0 percentage points.  The rise in long-term (6 
months+) sickness claimants, recorded by the Department of Social Security, accounts 
for a fall of 2.1 percentage points over the same period.  The rise in the number of 
economically inactive 16-24 year old students, recorded by the Labour Force Survey, 
accounts for a further fall of 1.0 percentage point.  Together, these two reductions in 
male economic activity appear to account for the whole of the fall, suggesting that there 
was stability in the overall number of early retirees. 
 
For women, the fall in economic activity rates of 0.5 per cent between 1991 and 1995 is 
exceeded by the reductions attributable to rising sickness (1.4 per cent) and 
economically inactive students (1.0 per cent).  The proportion of women who are full-
time looking after family/home is also likely to have changed, however, making it 
impossible to draw inferences about the number of early retirees. 
 
Permanent sickness 
 
Statistics on sickness claimants have been provided by the Department of Social 
Security (DSS) for August 1996.  These are based upon a 5 per cent sample of 
claimants.  A small number of cases are excluded as their details are not held centrally.  
The DSS also applies a grossing factor to the local figures to allow for a small number 
of unknown postcodes.  The DSS provides estimates for each district in Great Britain. 
 
The data covers numbers of persons of working age, separately for males and females, 
who fall into three categories:  Incapacity Benefit claimants;  those not entitled to 
Incapacity Benefit due to insufficient National Insurance contributions but in receipt of 
National Insurance credits in respect of their incapacity;  and those claiming Severe 
Disablement Allowance.  A small number of people claim both Incapacity Benefit and 
Severe Disablement Allowance but these are only counted once. 
 
The numbers recorded as ‘permanently sick’ by the 1991 Census and the sum of the 
numbers claiming Invalidity Benefit for 6 months or more and Severe Disablement 
Allowance in April 1991 are broadly comparable - roughly 900,000 men and 550,000 
women.  This suggests that the two sources of data on long-term sickness - self-reported 
and administrative - are likely to be counting broadly the same people. 
